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Cyber Safety: A theoretical Insight 
 
Abstract  
 
This paper is written by the EUCPN Secretariat following the topic of the Estonian 
Presidency of the Network, which is Cyber Safety. It gives a theoretical insight in what 
Cyber Safety is. 
Furthermore, we take interest in what the exact object is of cybercrime and have a 
deeper look into two European policy priorities, namely cyber-attacks and payment fraud. 
Moreover, these priorities are the subject of the European Crime Prevention award. The 
goal of this paper is to add to the digital awareness of local policy-makers and 
practitioners on a theoretical level. A toolbox will follow with legislative measures, 
existing policies and best practices on this topic. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Cyberspace is increasingly forming an integral part of everyday life. The opening paragraph of the 
Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union from 2013 depicts this idea: 
 
Five years after the inception of this strategy, this is even more the case. 85% of the households in the 
European Union have access to the 
internet (EUROSTAT, 2017).  The 
rise in use of smartphones and so-
called smart devices is one of the main 
drivers behind this fourth industrial 
revolution. Space and time themselves 
become relative as one can now easily 
control the temperature of his house 
while being at work. Video chats 
enable us to communicate throughout 
the world, effectively bringing the 
world in the palm of our hand. 
Moreover, the Internet of Things (IoT) 
does not even need human help to 
operate as it almost solely depends on 
intercommunication of connected 
devices. Smartness of technology and 
the ability of these devices to interact 
with each other offer numerous application possibilities in a myriad of environments ranging from 
hospitals to roads, cars, airports, factories and even smart cities (Elmaghraby & Losavio, 2014; Fu, et 
al., 2017; Zhang, et al., 2017).  
Source: European Commission, 2017, p.19 
“An open and free cyberspace has promoted political and social inclusion worldwide; it has 
broken down barriers between countries, communities and citizens, allowing interaction and 
sharing of information and ideas across the globe; it has provided a forum for freedom of 
expression and exercise of fundamental rights, and empowered people in their quest for 
democratic and more just societies” (European Commission, 2013, p. 2) 
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As society is digitalising, so is its crime; the flipside of this digital coin makes society however 
vulnerable to an extent not previously encountered (UNODC, 2013). Crime and its actors are very 
adaptive to this new environment (Skórzewska-Amberg, 2017; European Commission, 2013). Modern 
ICT devices and infrastructures are open for traditional types of criminal activities as well as new 
types of crime phenomena (Helfenstein & Saarliluoma, 2014). Cybercrime continues to grow and 
evolve (Europol, 2017c), but it is neither the scope nor interest of this paper to give a new overview of 
cybercrime. The European Crime Prevention Network published a thematic paper on this issue in 2015 
(EUCPN, 2015). Cybercrime as a relatively new phenomenon was situated in the criminological 
debate whether cybercrime constitutes a new type of crime or if these crimes are just the continuation 
of traditional crimes with different means (EUCPN, 2015). As an annex, a brief summary of the 
previous paper is presented as well as some extra input. The point of view in this previous paper was 
the one of the perpetrator. Yet, the current study turns this view around and starts from a potential 
victim’s perspective. 
The paper at hand concentrates on cyber safety. In order to fully take advantage of cyberspace, it is 
necessary to be aware of and be able to recognise the risks to online safety (Council of the European 
Union, 2017). The exponential evolution of cyberspace and its components makes it difficult for 
individuals, organisations, businesses, policy makers and governmental institutions to maintain a clear 
understanding of these risks (Sommer & Brown, 2011).  Being safe online and securing cyberspace 
are however one of the most important challenges of the 21th century (ENISA, 2016c). The opening 
statement from the Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council on ‘Resilience, 
Deterrence and Defence: Building strong cybersecurity for the EU’ (2017) makes this challenge 
concrete: 
  
We will start by referring to the definitions on cyber safety in academic literature. As with cybercrime 
itself, the term does not go uncontested. What’s more, we will dig deeper into the digital coin 
discussion. Anonymization is a perfect example of benefits for both sides of the user’s spectrum and 
has beneficiary effects for users with good and malicious intentions. A second section will clarify the 
commodification of data and tries to show how this data is of interest for criminals. Thirdly, we will 
“Cybersecurity is critical to both our prosperity and our security. As our daily lives and 
economies become increasingly dependent on digital technologies, we become more and more 
exposed. Cybersecurity incidents are diversifying both in terms of who is responsible and what 
they seek to achieve. Malicious cyber activities not only threaten our economies and the drive to 
the Digital Single Market, but also the very functioning of our democracies, our freedoms and 
our values” (European Commission , 2017, p. 2) 
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list up the types of threats to these data and focus more specifically on card fraud and cyber-attacks. A 
fourth section will explore preventive and security measures. 
In the toolbox on Cyber Safety, a more practical focus will be maintained. Policy and legislative 
measures will be considered as well as good practices throughout the European Union. Policy-related 
definitions and agenda setting are discussed here as well. This thematic paper has a more academic 
point of view. As such, this paper aims to contribute to raising digital awareness of local policy-
makers and practitioners on a theoretical level and to clarify what risks exist and against which threats 
protection is needed.  
2. What does it mean to be safe online? 
 
At first glance, safety and security are words that seem clear and precise, but depending on the context 
they might have different meanings. Even linguistically speaking, explaining the difference is a 
difficult task. In some languages there even is a single word for both safety and security, for example 
in Spanish (Seguridad) or Swedish (Säkerhet) (Piètre-Cambacédès & Chaudet, 2010). In Dutch, an 
active-passive distinction can be made between safety as the active situation and security as the 
securing actions to achieve this. In French the translation differs depending on the context. Piètre-
Cambacédès & Chaudet (2010) show two different ways to distinct safety and security based on an 
extensive literature review. 
1. System vs. Environment distinction: here security is concerned with environmental 
originating risks, potentially impacting the system. Safety however deals with the risks 
arising from the system, impacting the environment. 
2. Malicious vs. Accidental distinction: security in this distinction deals with malicious risks 
and safety with accidental risks. 
Based on both distinctions, one could argue that in the cyber context the environment is cyberspace 
and the system is the individual user and his point of access to cyberspace (distinction 1) and that 
malicious risks originate from this environment, more specifically cybercrime (distinction 2). As such, 
cyber safety could be described as the perfect situation where individuals move through cyberspace – 
in space and time – where they safely and responsibly use Information and Communication 
Technologies (ICT) (Third, Forrest-Lawrence, & Collier, 2014). We do not pretend to form an 
exhaustive and all-encompassing definition of cyber safety here. Rather a working definition is 
presented to guide us through theoretical issues. Nor does cyber safety apply directly to crimes as 
cyber bullying since the involvement of data is key when talking about cyber safety.  Data corruption 
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or dissemination for example could be a constituent part of cyber bullying, and it is exactly this part 
we are interested in here.   
One of the ways of being safe online is the use of encryption. Services as WhatsApp, Jabber, 
Viber,… have increasingly adopted more thorough ways of encryption in order to ensure privacy. 
WhatsApp recently changed its encryption to end-to-end encryption providing better privacy 
protection. Inherent to these messaging systems is the asynchronous aspect. One must be able to send 
a message to another person, even if the latter is offline. This is a perfect example of the absence of 
time in cyberspace. Typically, the encrypted message is temporarily stored on a server while the 
receiver of the message is offline (Cohn-Gordon, Cremers, Garratt, Millican, & Milner, 2017). With 
end–to-end encryption, only the people within the chat can decrypt and read the messages in this type 
of encryption. The central server is no longer able to read these texts since only the people in the chat 
have the decryption key (Europol, 2016a). This allows users to communicate freely without the risk of 
being spied upon (Toldinas, Venckauskas, Grigaliunas, Damasevicius, & Jusas, 2015). 
Another anonymization tool is the use of e-currency such as Bitcoins. E-currency is a medium to 
exchange money on the web and avoid being exposed (Gad, 2014). Bitcoins and others use a 
blockchain structure in order to provide almost absolute privacy (Dorri, Kanhere, Jurdak, & 
Gauravaram, 2017). Moreover, this solves what the inventor of Bitcoin and blockchain called the 
‘inherent weakness of the trust based model’ (Nakamoto, 2008, p. 1). Commerce on the internet relies 
almost exclusively on financial institutions as trusted third parties to verify electronic payments. It is 
difficult for the user to avoid these parties as they mediate all transactions. What blockchain and 
consequently Bitcoin do, is taking out these mediating parties and replacing the trust-based system 
with a peer-to-peer network where trust is replaced with encryption (Nakamoto, 2008; EMCDDA & 
Europol, 2017). 
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Apart from anonymizing certain aspects of the user’s action in cyberspace, it is possible to be entirely 
anonymous while online. TOR, Freenet or I2P are network services providing users protection from 
traffic analysis, which threatens personal freedom, privacy, confidential activities,… These networks 
enable anonymous and almost untraceable access to the internet and more specifically to what is 
known as the Deep Web (Gad, 2014; Europol, 2016a). This Deep Web is a part of the internet which 
is not accessible through normal browsers (e.g. Internet Explorer) or search engines (e.g. Google) 
(Berghel, 2017). These traditional services only scratch the Surface Web. TOR or The Onion Router is 
probably the most (in) famous anonymity network to access the Deep Web. It redirects the user’s 
signals through nearly 6 000 servers, effectively concealing a user’s location or usage from anyone 
conducting network surveillance or traffic analysis (Gad, 2014; Lacson & Jones, 2016; Spalevic & 
Ilic, 2017). 
A subdivision of the Deep Web is called the Dark Net. This is traditionally presented with the use of 
an iceberg analogy. The Dark Net represents a certain amount of content of the Deep Web that is used 
for illegal activities such as selling drugs, illegal weapons, etc. (Sunde, 2016; Spalevic & Ilic, 2017; 
EMCDDA & Europol, 2017). It is not surprising that criminals have taken advantage of these 
networks. TOR is the perfect example of this perverse effect as it is a favourable tool within the 
cybercrime universe. Anonymization is of course of equal interest to criminals as they can easily 
conceal their identity, the hosting location of criminal websites, forums, markets,… (Europol, 2016a; 
Toldinas, Venckauskas, Grigaliunas, Damasevicius, & Jusas, 2015).  A recent joint report by the 
European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction and Europol (2017) estimates that 62 % of 
Digital: bitcoin is based on only electronic records. There is no 
gold or other tangible asset supporting bitcoin.  
Decentralised: the system managing bitcoin is decentralised 
through the use of a peer-to-peer network. Every member of 
the network has software that distributes the management of 
the currency.  
Open source: the software needed to acquire and use bitcoin is 
free and available to anyone.  
Public ledger: all bitcoin transactions are recorded in a public 
ledger called the blockchain, stored on the decentralised 
network. When a transaction is made with bitcoin, this is 
entered in the ledger, preventing the user from spending the 
bitcoin twice.  
Generated through mining: new bitcoins can be generated 
through a process called mining, which enables the creation of a 
new blockchain 
Source: EMCDDA &  Europol (2017), Drugs and the Darknet: 
Perspectives for enforcement, research and policy, p23 
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the darknet markets content is related to drugs, the other 38% goes to fraud and counterfeit, guides and 
tutorials, hacking and malware, firearms and explosives, and some other categories.  
 
   
 
  
Source: EMCDDA & Europol (2016). EU Drug Markets Reports. In Depth Analysis, p.47 
 
Theoretical paper: Cyber Safety 
 
 
10 
 
3. Data as a commodity  
 
All actors of the current society increasingly rely on cyberspace (Council of the European Union, 
2017). Conveniently, criminals have entered the cyber arena as well. ‘Society gets the crime it 
deserves’ is an all too familiar maxim. Cyberspace presents itself as a society or – perhaps more fitting 
– environment where crime seems to flourish (Helfenstein & Saarliluoma, 2014). It is clear that 
criminals have seen the benefits of data as a commodity and turned it into an opportunity. Indeed, data 
has become one of the most important commodities in contemporary society. Personal information 
roams freely on the internet. Social media can identify our networks and interests. Just as the world is 
in the palm of our hands, our privacy could be in the palms of a criminal. 
Data has become a key commodity for criminals and new opportunities keep presenting themselves 
(Europol, 2017e). One of these opportunities is the development of the Internet of Things (IoT) and 
the ‘smartness’ of devices. Smart devices typically contain a large amount of sensitive personal data as 
they provide services to the user based on the gathered data (Arabo & Pranggono, 2013). 
Smartphones, smart TV’s, smart refrigerators, smart washing machines,… a lot of home and personal 
appliances have come to get connected to the internet and make peoples’ lives more convenient (Kang, 
Moon, & Park, 2017). The last couple of years have been characterized by a huge development and 
demand for seamless interconnectivity of smart devices (Arabo & Pranggono, 2013). The Internet of 
Things is the current pinnacle of this development where smart devices are connected with each other 
and with the individuals using them (Sunde, 2016). This creates the ability for physical objects, which 
were previously often unconnected and without computing power, and people to remotely interact and 
thereby creating a worldwide network of uniquely addressable interconnected ‘things’ (Toldinas, 
Venckauskas, Grigaliunas, Damasevicius, & Jusas, 2015; Stojkoska & Trivodaliev, 2016). 
The IoT has led to the conception of smart environments. Smart homes are a perfect example (ENISA, 
2015b). In interoperation with smart devices (e.g. the thermostat, light sensors, cameras, door 
locks,…), the smart home offers living conveniences for users taking their living patterns and its 
accumulated experience in consideration (Kang, Moon, & Park, 2017; Zeng, Mare, & Roesner, 2017; 
Stojkoska & Trivodaliev, 2016). The possibilities are endless and are making it possible for users to 
control their house regardless of space and time (Kang, Moon, & Park, 2017). You could be in the 
subway checking if you actually did lock your front door via the app on your smartphone (Sunde, 
2016).  
The smart home is not the only possible smart environment. A smart hospital for instance relies on 
optimized and automated processes based on the IoT to improve patient care procedures and 
introduced new capabilities to healthcare (Zhang, et al., 2017; ENISA, 2015a; ENISA, 2016e). Smart 
airports are another environment producing more seamless, secure and safe passenger experiences 
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(ENISA, 2016d). Smart cars provide drivers and passengers added-value services via connected 
infotainment systems such as hands-free telephone and messaging systems or adjusting the cars 
trajectory when unwillingly crossing the traffic lane due to absentmindedness (ENISA, 2016a; 
Elmaghraby & Losavio, 2014). 
Needless to say that criminals are interested in these vast amounts of data (Arias, Ly, & Jin, 2017; 
Dorri, Kanhere, Jurdak, & Gauravaram, 2017; Yang, Wu, Yin, Li, & Zhao, 2017). Once they have 
access to this data, it can reveal sensitive information about a user’s online and offline activities that 
are transmitted through the IoT (Apthorpe, Reisman, & Feamster, 217). The gathered data could help 
position a user’s location for example (Sharma, Dixit, Pathik, & Sahu, 2017). It is clear that data is not 
‘just data’ and represents another dimension. As such data is the commodification of other online or 
offline objects or qualities.  
First and foremost, privacy issues are commodified into data (Zeng, Mare, & Roesner, 2017). A 
smartphone today is almost a personal assistant, containing loads of personal data such as your social 
network or your personal notes. Also having your home address in the GPS of your car could lead 
criminals to your address (Elmaghraby & Losavio, 2014). And even in your home, obtaining the data 
gathered from movements in your house is a severe breach of privacy concerns (Zeng, Mare, & 
Roesner, 2017). Patient records in smart hospitals contain the same privacy issues (ENISA, 2015a; 
ENISA, 2016e). 
Another object that is commodified is property. To explain this, it is interesting to look at ransomware. 
In short, this malware encrypts data and only releases this data when a ransom is paid (cf. infra). In 
2017 a ransomware called WannaCry infected around 300 000 systems. The data encrypted 
represented money, transaction orders, telephone records,… (ENISA, 2017; Europol, 2017c). This 
property commodification can best be seen in online banking applications. Once access is no longer 
secure, criminals can steal your money and for example immediately convert it to Bitcoins, 
anonymizing their identity (Bucko, 2017).  
As such, almost anything can be commodified into data and consequently be taken advantage of by 
criminals. Even time itself can be of interest. Spamming for example is a very time consuming 
victimization but mostly harmless. Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) however creates a moment in 
time where a server can no longer process all data and can tear down activities in this manner 
(Europol, 2016a). The data here represents the time needed for the server to process it.   
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4. Threats to Cyber Safety  
 
In order to contribute to ‘digital awareness’ we will draw attention to some of the used techniques and 
types of cybercrime. This however is not exhaustive. The reader is referred to the previous paper of 
EUCPN on cybercrime, a report by ENISA where an effort was made in 2016 to come up with a threat 
taxonomy and the Internet Organised Crime Threat Assessments by Europol (ENISA, 2016b; EUCPN, 
2015; Europol, 2017c; Europol, 2016a). A focus will be put on cyber-attacks, such as malware and 
DDoS, and payment fraud.  
Cyber-Attacks 
 
Attacks in and on cyberspace are more often than not caused by malware. Malicious software or 
malware encompasses a wide range of products that enable perpetrators to gain unauthorised access to 
data (Rand Corporation, 2015; Europol, 2017c). According to the IOCTA of 2016, there are two broad 
families of malware (Europol, 2016a). One is payload malware where the goal is to obtain money or 
other valuable goods such as information, virtual or not. The other family exists of enabling or 
facilitating malware. Here a specific type of malware is used to spread or install other malware 
(Europol, 2016a).  
Within the first family, ransomware is probably the most known and is a dominant concern for EU law 
enforcement (Europol, 2016a). In 2016 law enforcement agencies noted a 750% increase in 
ransomware families (Europol, 2017c). This type of malware infects computer systems as a virus 
(replicates through execution of a program), worm (replicates itself in a network) or Trojan horse 
(embedded within another installed program) and denies their users access unless upon paying a 
ransom (Rand Corporation, 2015; Europol, 2017b). This ransom could be in the form of money but 
can easily be information that is of interest to the attacker. Cryptoware is a specific type of 
ransomware where files are encrypted in order to deny the user access to his or her own files (Europol, 
2017e).    
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Recently, Europe and the rest of the world were shook by a massive ransomware outburst. This 
WannaCry ransomware affected more than 150 countries and infected about 300 000 systems in May 
2017 causing chaos due to its large scale of distribution and timing. The attackers timed the release of 
their malware right before the weekend, leaving businesses vulnerable for a few days. Moreover, the 
malware also targeted critical infrastructure, for example the UK’s National Health Service (ENISA, 
2017; Europol, 2017c). What’s more is that these attacks are growing in sophistication. This makes it 
even more difficult to decrypt your hijacked files (Europol, 2016b). One month after WannaCry, (Not) 
Petya targeted 20 000 machines around the globe and was already a lot harder to ‘crack’ (Europol, 
2017c).  
Other payload malware are Remote Access Trojans (RAT). This type of malware is typically installed 
by other malware and gives almost complete control to the attacker (Europol, 2017b). RATs are also 
getting more custom-made, which makes it harder to identify the malware and their operators 
(Europol, 2017c). These other, enabling malware types are the second family containing exploit kits, 
droppers, spam,… (Europol, 2016a). Spam for example is the mass sending of emails or other 
electronic messages to people who did not ask for it (EUCPN, 2015). These can range from being 
Source: Europol. (2017c). Internet Organised Crime Threat Assessment (IOCTA). The 
Hague: Europol, p.26 
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harmless and ‘inbox-filling’ to advertising material or services leading the recipients to the real scams, 
malicious websites or containing malware (Zappa, 2014).  Exploit kits are also part of this second 
family. These kits are software tools used to get other software on the victim’s system. They exploit 
security holes in the operating system (Rand Corporation, 2015; Johnson, 2013). Zero-day kits for 
example target security vulnerabilities in a system originating to the initial start of the system before 
the developers are aware of this problem.    
A DoS is another key cyber-attack according to Europol (2016a). In a Denial of Service attack, the 
attacked system receives a lot of data in such a way that it can no longer respond to it and as such 
denying the service normally provided by the attacked system (Nagy & Mezei, 2016; Zappa, 2014). A 
DDoS or Distributed DoS is launched from multiple connected devices that are distributed across the 
internet (Nagy & Mezei, 2016). This type of cyber-attack is a favourable tactic of hacktivists as well 
(Rand Corporation, 2015). Anonymous for example launched several (D)DoS attacks against the 
Church of Scientology in 2008, or more recently against ISIS websites.  
The multiple connected devices in a DDoS could be used as a botnet (Europol, 2016a). Here a network 
of malware infected devices is controlled by attackers (Arabo & Pranggono, 2013; Zappa, 2014). In 
October 2016 the Mirai botnet, consisting of connected IoT devices, launched an attack on Dyn, a 
company offering internet domain names. The attack affected internet access for the US’s west coast 
for about 2 hours. One month later, a variant of the network attacked Deutsche Telekom, resulting in a 
similar outcome. These networks provide criminals with immense computer capacity to conduct all 
kinds of cybercrime such as banking fraud, spam, DDoS attacks,… (Rand Corporation, 2015; Europol, 
2017c). 
A whole array of cyber-attacks is possible and potential criminals do not even need a high level of 
skill to pursue them. The Crime-as-a-Service model (see Annex, p.23) provides easy access to the 
tools and services that are required to carry out attacks, driving the digital underground economy in 
doing so (Europol, 2017e; Toldinas, Venckauskas, Grigaliunas, Damasevicius, & Jusas, 2015; Gad, 
2014). Due to a division of labour in this underground, the model is booming. Malware could be sold 
or rented out, criminals could be payed to hack a certain account, money mules could be found to 
interrupt the money trail pointing to criminals, and even brokers exist to act as a trusted intermediary 
in criminal transactions… (Leukfeldt & Jansen, 2015; Gad, 2014; Europol, 2014).  As a result, there is 
a huge disparity between the costs of attacks and the costs for both prevention and reparation 
(Europol, 2017c).  
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Payment fraud 
 
The drive for trust with the blockchain system might also stem from the practices surrounding 
payment fraud on the web. There are different types of payment fraud. One is card-present fraud 
where the practice of skimming is most common (Europol, 2016a). Here, card data is extracted from 
the magnetic strip of a payment card by mechanical tools or malware installed on the ATM and is later 
on used online or offline (Europol, 2017e; EUCPN, 2015; Europol, 2017c). E-commerce fraud on the 
other hand consists of 66% of total card fraud practices (Europol, 2016a). This type of fraud intervenes 
in card-not-present transactions where the plastic card is not handed to the merchant or machine at the 
time of payment or transaction (Ali, Arief, Emms, & van Moorsel, 2017; Smart Card Alliance, 2014). 
In card-not-present fraud criminals use the card data to purchase products and services in an e-
commerce setting, e.g. the Dark Net. In a majority of cases, the victims are unaware of this 
unauthorised use of their card which is still in their actual possession (Europol, 2017d). Automated 
card shops (ACS) offer fraudsters automated click-and-buy sites where they can search for cards. A 
large number of these are scam sites where criminals effectively ‘rip off each other’ (Europol, 2017c).  
A common tactic to obtain the card data is by phishing (Europol, 2017a). This specific form of 
spamming takes advantage of the cyberspace effects on human behaviour (Agustina, 2015; 
Bhattacharyya, Jha, Tharakunnel, & Westland, 2011; Skórzewska-Amberg, 2017). The aim is to 
deceive the victim to obtain personal information (EUCPN, 2015; Jansen & Leukfeldt, 2016; Zappa, 
2014). In the case of payment fraud, the goal is of course to gather the user credentials of the card 
(Choo, 2011). This can either be a massive scam or a more tailored attack which is called spear-
phishing (EUCPN, 2015; Vishwakarma, 2017). 
The problem for the fraudster stays however: he needs to move the victim into a mindset where he 
engages in an exploitive interaction (Burgard & Schlembach, 2013). Mostly, social engineering of the 
victim takes place in order to achieve this (Moreno-Fernández, Blanco, Garaizar, & Matute, 2017). 
Social engineering is a set of techniques that exploit human behaviour through deception, identity 
hiding or assuming a different identity. In other words, attackers exploit the weakest link in cyber 
security: the human (Europol, 2016a; Zappa, 2014; Europol, 2017c).  
An example of assuming a different identity is CEO fraud. Here, the attacker could contact an 
employee speaking to him as if it was the CEO (Europol, 2016a). A preliminary investigation is done 
by the attacker to become acquainted with the firm and its structure, the CEO’s linguistic 
characteristics,… in order to fulfil the scam (Uma & Padmavathi, 2013). A familiar manner in 
literature to explain the mechanisms underlying this is by the six principles of influence by Cialdini 
(Uebelacker & Quiel, 2014; Cialdini, 2009). 
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 Reciprocation: a social norm that obliges people to repay what another person provided us; 
 Commitment and consistency : the urge to behave in compliance with what we already did 
and said;  
 Social proof: the tendency to validate an action as positive when peers often engage in this 
specific action; 
 Liking: not fulfilling a request for example is considered disrespectful. We want people to 
like us; 
 Authority: Police ransomware uses this influence factor as it takes advantage of the perceived 
authority law enforcement has over people. Victims follow their orders more easily; 
 Scarcity: people value certain things more as there are is less availability.  
If we further elaborate on the CEO fraud, we can see how ‘authority’ is an obvious influencer, but also 
not being perceived as disrespectful (‘liking’), ‘consistency’ and other factors come into play. 
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5. Prevention, security and the circular movement 
 
One of the characteristics of cybercrime is the asymmetry aspect. Because of this, law enforcement 
struggles to keep up with the ever changing modi operandi of the perpetrators (EUCPN, 2015). We 
could almost say that - as is the case with drug traffic or illegal migration – a waterbed effect is in 
play. The moment the police for example are familiar with a certain malware, criminals already moved 
on to another and more sophisticated one. Add this to the difficulties arising from transposing 
traditional criminological theories (see Annex) and you have no real ‘guidebook’ to formulate 
prevention strategies. To be clear, what we mean by prevention here is prevention targeted at ‘cyber 
victimization’ and more specifically to threats to cyber safety. 
According to Reyns, Randa and Henson (2016), the leading approach for prevention of cyber safety 
issues focusses on reducing opportunities. As it is difficult to perceive who will be victim and when it 
will happen, focusing on the moment it does happen seems almost the best option. This automatically 
leads us to situational crime prevention and circles back to Routine Activity Theory (cf. Annex). 
Situational crime prevention mainly tries to manipulate the situational characteristics that generate 
criminal opportunities (Jacques & Bonomo, 2017). Cyber security fits this idea perfectly. Although 
definitions differ on what cyber security exactly is, logically speaking it is the securing of cyberspace 
(Christou, 2017; Dewar, 2017; Carrapico & Barrinha, 2017; Rand Corporation, 2015; OECD, 2012; 
CEN/CENELEC Cyber Security Focus Group, 2017; RAND Corporation, 2016).  
This securing is done by technologies and processes to protect computers, networks and data from 
unauthorized access, vulnerabilities and attacks by cyber criminals, hence taking away the situational 
characteristics for crime genesis (Aggarwal, Arora, Neha, & Poonam, 2014). Examples of these are 
installing firewall and other anti-virus software to counter harmful programs (Brenner & Clarke, 
2005). However, these processes are not merely computational (Agustina, 2015). As stated earlier, 
unauthorized access can be staged by a process called ‘social engineering’. Securing would then also 
mean being able to resist to this danger (Brenner & Clarke, 2005). The work of Miló LLinares (2012)  
is of specific interest here. This author transformed the 25 techniques of situational crime prevention 
of Cornish and Clarke (2003) to a cyber context. The table below shows his reinterpretation.  
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REDUCING 
ENVIRONMENT OF 
INCIDENCE 
 
INCREASING 
PERCIEVED 
EFFORT 
 
INCREASING 
PERCEIVED 
RISK 
 
REDUCING 
PERCEIVED 
REWARDS 
 
ELIMINATING 
EXCUSES 
 
Don’t introduce targets 
Separation of hard drives 
with and without access to 
system; 
Systems of parental 
control; 
Content filters; 
ActiveX security controls; 
No access to chat rooms 
(grooming) 
Control access 
to system 
Firewall; 
Update 
operating 
systems; 
Passwords for 
system access; 
Passwords for 
access to web; 
Update 
passwords; 
Profiles on 
social networks 
Extend 
guardianship 
Forum 
moderators; 
Echelon, 
Enfopol, 
Carnivore and 
Dark Web 
systems 
Hide targets 
Use systems of 
encryption; 
Hide personal 
data on social 
networks; 
Don’t use 
bank 
passwords; 
Perfect 
ecommerce 
systems 
Set rules 
International 
legal 
harmonisation; 
“Netiquette” 
Identify risk zones 
Informational campaigns 
about risks; 
Advise network of spam 
infections; 
White and blacklists of 
web 
and spam; 
Identify bots 
Detect and 
impede the 
attack 
Antivirus; 
Antispyware; 
Antispam; 
systems of 
control for 
electronic 
banking 
Reduce 
anonymity 
Identify IPs; 
Registration on 
web forums; 
User 
identification 
systems; 
Biometric 
identification 
and 
authentication 
Remove 
targets 
Removable 
hard drives; 
Alternative 
payment 
systems 
(PayPal); 
Change web 
addresses, 
domains and 
other 
 
Set rules 
Web licence 
notifications: 
copyright and 
‘copyleft’; 
Privacy 
notifications on 
social networks 
Decontamination/residue 
cleanup 
Erase and destroy latent 
viruses; 
Bot disinfection 
Deflect 
offenders 
Close networks; 
Request 
removal of 
illicit 
content; 
Flagging 
mechanisms on 
social networks; 
Denial of access 
to specific IPs. 
Strengthen 
formal 
surveillance 
Control 
networks 
through proxy; 
Specialized 
teams for cyber 
crime 
persecution 
Remove 
benefits 
Persecution of 
buyers of illicit 
content; 
persecution of 
money 
laundering 
Strengthen 
moral 
conscience 
Raise 
consciousness 
about intellectual 
property; 
Morally enforce 
legitimate 
businesses 
Separatation of targets 
Internet2; 
Creation of local security 
sub-networks 
Control 
tools/weapons 
Obligatory 
vigilance 
through IPPPS; 
Control data 
through RSS 
Assist natural 
surveillance 
Improve IP 
identification 
systems; 
Reconstruct 
architecture 
with defensive 
ends 
 
Disrupt 
markets 
Offer 
economic 
systems of file 
sharing 
(Spotify and 
others); 
Control direct 
file download 
sites 
Assist 
compliance 
New business 
models (Apple); 
Legal hacker 
competitions; 
Strengthen open 
software 
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Within criminology, there are however some well-known problems with situational crime prevention. 
One of the hardest critics is the blaming of the victim. This view is probably best formulated by 
blaming rape victims of inciting the perpetrator (Wortley, 2010). The RAT theory is disputed to be 
applicable to cyberspace. The same remark could be made regarding the critic ‘blaming the victim’. 
Due to the different characteristics of cybercrime, who could blame the victim? The ubiquity of 
victims because of the anti-spatial and anti-temporal features of cyberspace leaves almost everyone 
open to victimization. This is shown for example in a study by Jansen and Leukfeldt (2016) where the 
value or visibility of a potential victim has no specific impact on being the subject of online banking 
fraud. Again, a counter example could be made with social engineering where victims could be 
blamed of naivety or thoughtlessness (Agustina, 2015).  
To leave this discussion, it suffices to say that criminology and prevention strategies have a difficult 
time in cyberspace. In order to be able to devise grounded prevention and security it is however 
necessary to further examine the threats that need to be addressed and against what these threats are 
aimed for. Just as it is perhaps more interesting to characterize cybercrime rather than actually define 
it, the same might apply to elaborate on the objects that have to be secured and the threats to cyber 
safety.  
Note that it is here that the distinction between safety and security is blurred. The reader may have 
noticed that although cyber safety and cyber security are considered separately, security 
measures were proposed while describing safety. To be anonymous on the web is considered safe 
use of ICT. In order to achieve this, anonymization is necessary. The act of encryption for example is 
such a security measure. The blockchain mechanism is a securing mechanism to bypass the trust issues 
existing in traditional online trade, rendering online payments ‘safe’. The distinction made in the 
working definition thus becomes irrelevant seeing this circular movement of safety and security 
in cyberspace. This inextricable link between the two terms is why they are used variably throughout 
literature and policy (Wolf & Serpanos, 2017). Conversely, cybercriminals also use safety and security 
measures as illustrated in the following figure. 
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6. Conclusion 
 
The main goal of this paper was to further draw on the picture of the cyber safety and security 
landscape and building on the previous cybercrime paper of the EUCPN. Firstly, we tried to define 
what is considered safe in cyberspace. Secondly, we took an interest in what actually composes the 
object of cybercrime. Putting the different definitions of cybercrime aside, it becomes clear that data is 
the encompassing object. Without degrading all cybercrime to data-theft, we saw that data is the 
commodification of other values such as privacy, property or even time. Data in this way is never ‘just 
data’. Thirdly, two different threats to cyber safety and security where considered. Cyber-attacks were 
narrowed down to malware, DDoS attacks and botnets. Payment fraud was discussed in light of 
phishing and social engineering. However, the two types of threats do not rule each other out since 
malware for example can easily be hidden in phishing e-mails. A last section provided insight on 
preventing victimization online and securing cyberspace.  
In conclusion, we can say that cyberspace is as much a crime-generator as a crime-attractor 
(Agustina, 2015). Different aspects of this environment have led to a rise in new or old crimes. This 
sets the scene for a very difficult policy and practitioner’s field. Nonetheless, safety and security in 
cyberspace will play a crucial role in the next couple of years with a society that is digitalizing in 
a massive pace. A toolbox will be written on the policy and practice of this delicate subject.  
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Annex: The criminological definitional problem 
 
As with many criminal phenomena, criminologists are discussing the definition of cybercrime. 
Defining often says more about the view of the one that is defining, rather than the actual phenomenon 
at hand. This is even more so the case when defining cybercrime. There are two very different views 
in this discussion. The transformationist view states that cybercrime is a totally new form of crime 
(EUCPN, 2015; Leukfeldt & Yar, 2016). Jaishankar, one of the founders of cyber criminology, is a 
fierce proponent of this view. He expresses the need for cyber theories that are apt to explain crime in 
cyberspace (Jaishankar, 2011). As such, cybercrime represents a new and distinctive format of crime, 
creating challenges to the prediction and prevention of it (UNODC, 2013). Even the prefix ‘cyber’ 
suggests that this phenomenon occurs in a space different from where humans normally interact 
(Sunde, 2016). Moreover, theoretical issues with traditional criminological theories arise. The usual 
suspects for example in many ‘real life’ theories are minorities, poorly educated offenders, originating 
from the lower classes, etc. Cybercriminals however tend to be well educated middle-class members 
(Diamond & Bachmann, 2015; Leukfeldt & Yar, 2016). It has led Jaishankar to theorize the ‘space 
transition theory’ which has as its prime assumption that people behave differently when they move 
from one space to another. For example, people with repressed criminal behaviour in physical space 
have, according to this theory, a propensity to commit crimes in cyberspace, crimes that they would 
never do due to their status and socio-economic position (Jaishankar, 2011).  
On the other hand, the continuist view sees cybercrime merely as ‘old wine in new bottles’. These 
proponents state that cybercrime is conventional crime going digital. The affected interests still remain 
the same. A fraudster is still a fraudster even if he does it online (Leukfeldt & Yar, 2016; Viano, 
2017). The tools in achieving the goal of the crime changed, not the intrinsic crime (EUCPN, 2015). 
Apart from defining cybercrime, it is perhaps more interesting to look at its characteristics as is done 
in the earlier EUCPN paper. The international and borderless aspect of cybercrimes is a first 
characteristic. This has a rather special effect since the criminal objects come to the criminal, leading 
to an increased availability of potential victims (Helfenstein & Saarliluoma, 2014). Moreover, due to 
the scalability of crimes, perpetrators can easily replicate crimes on a massive scale. A perfect 
example of this is phishing. Anonymity as a characteristic does not need much more explanation. As 
stated in the paper, as well as providing cyber safety to the typical user, the anonymization effect of 
the internet is of equal interest to the malevolent user. What’s more, users could potentially be 
victimized without even knowing. Another characteristic, asymmetry, is something we find in other 
phenomena as well. Just as with the designer drug market, police and justice authorities are struggling 
to keep up with new modi operandi and products.  
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Low marginal cost of online activity is one of the reasons why cybercrime is so attractive. Computers 
and other programs almost do the dirty work for perpetrators, augmenting the perceived sense of 
safety and anonymity in the process. Lowering these costs even more is the nature of criminal 
cooperation in cyberspace. As a result of this a ‘Crime-as-a-service’ model has grown. Here 
cybercriminals share, rent or sell their malware, computing resources and hosting services to the lesser 
cyber adapt criminals (Gad, 2014). This model facilitates virtually any type of cybercrime by making 
it almost child’s play (Toldinas, Venckauskas, Grigaliunas, Damasevicius, & Jusas, 2015). Add these 
characteristics to specific criminal motives as financial gain, emotion, sexual impulses, politics or 
religion and ‘fun’ together with an enormous availability of potential victims and you have the perfect 
recipe to apply the Routine Activity Theory to cybercrime. Or not? 
Especially from a crime prevention perspective, the Routine Activity Theory (RAT) has had an 
enormous impact. And more often than not, RAT is at the centre of theoretical discussions about 
applicability to cyberspace (Leukfeldt & Yar, 2016). According to this theory crime risk increases 
upon a convergence of time and space of three factors: a motivated offender, a suitable target and 
absence of capable guardians (Jansen & Leukfeldt, 2016; UNODC, 2013; Reyns, Randa, & Henson, 
2016). A literature review on nine empirical studies on RAT’s applicability to cybercrime by 
Leukfeldt & Yar (2016) shows mixed results. Five studies have positive results, while six of them 
came to a negative conclusion. The same mixed results were shown by Ngo & Paternoster (2011) 
depending on the type of cybercrime.  
Yar (2005) formulates criticism on RAT as a valid theory for cybercrime because of the ecological 
problem. The transposability of RAT to cyberspace requires that cyberspace has a similar spatio-
temporal ontology as the physical world. As stated before, time and space are relative in cyberspace. 
Notions of place location and spatial separation are first of all non-existent in an environment that is 
anti-spatial. The imagery of having the world in your hand is exemplary here. Secondly, temporal 
structures are problematic as well. There are no particular points in time at which actors can be 
expected to be generally present or absent from the environment (Yar, 2005). Furthermore, suitable 
targets can be constructed by social engineering leaving victims to play a crucial role in their own 
victimization (Jansen & Leukfeldt, 2016). Cyberspace seems to foster attitudes of excessive trust, 
naivety or thoughtlessness which offenders happily take advantage of (Agustina, 2015). 
Other theories are being tested as well. Social learning theories, where potential criminals learn from 
peers, are also noteworthy here. Especially on the Dark Net and applying this to the Crime-as-a-
Service model promises to be very interesting (Diamond & Bachmann, 2015).  
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